MOSCOW: Will the sinking of the submarine Kursk and the death of all its crew also sink the Putin revolution? Until now President Putin’s power was unique in Russian history – it was based on his vast popularity, one legitimized by the vote. He could browbeat Russia’s oligarchs into submission and recast the upper house of the Duma to make it bend to his will because he was universally popular and the other elements of Russia’s mostly discredited government knew it. His handling of the Kursk crisis, however, dented that democratic mandate because Putin seemed as contemptuous of human life as all his predecessors in the Kremlin. How well he recovers will determine whether or not Putin’s revolution will remain a democratic one, or whether he will revert to autocracy to pursue his goals.
I have no doubt that Putin will find people to blame for the failure to seek outside help for the Kursk in time. Indeed, the Kursk crisis may provide him with an opportunity to further clean house in the military. The first tests of his ability to recover are the looming regional elections across Russia. Between October and December over 40% of our country’s governorships will be up for grabs in new elections. As a restoration of Moscow’s authority over the country is a central plank in the president’s platform, he needs to restore his popularity fast.
Although Putin's reforms to the upper house of the Duma have already stripped the governors of their status as federal power brokers as well as of their parliamentary immunity, governorships retain wide powers in their regions. Few can now strut the national stage, or thumb their nose at the Kremlin, as they did during the Yeltsin era, but their powers are real and reigning them in won’t be easy.
Putin’s dominance has already changed the way these campaigns will be run. Money is now less important than even a year ago. What matters now is control over administrative power, and the appointment of presidential prefects throughout Russia gives the Kremlin a powerful hand in directing state administration. Since campaigns will be cheaper, governors will find it hard to buy reelection because opponents will be able to mount a credible opposition.
Even if a governor wants to buy an election, the sources of campaign cash are drying up. The oligarchs, who once sought close ties to regional bosses in hope of securing the help of governors in taking control of local factories, mines, and other assets, have been cowed by Putin. Indeed, the President’s blunt "message" to them is clear: stay out of politics. But if Russia’s richest men think the president damaged seriously, they may jump back into politics and fund his regional opponents.
Still, even if weakened, Putin benefits from a changed economy. Only 17.9% of potential voters now deem the country’s situation as "catastrophic", a much smaller proportion than at any time since communism’s end; only 15.6% say that they live below the poverty line. So the protest vote is falling. Moreover, economic growth is everywhere to be seen. In some places, the Chelyabinsk region, for example, it is up a whopping 25% on a year ago.
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This "economic miracle" in some parts of the Federation means that some regions have long since paid their pension and wage arrears. A democratic "feel good" factor is in play. Here, Putin has delivered something unique in Russian history: people are more satisfied with their government’s economic performance, not because of propaganda, but because their lives are visibly improving.
This means that the great battle of communists versus democratic reformers, that dominated every election since 1991, is a thing of the past. People do not care a bit about ideology. They are more concerned about prices, job opportunities, healthcare and education. They want a government that reflects their human values, as the response to the Kursk shows. Gripes about restrictions on freedom of expression or economic freedom, which are popular in Moscow, have few echoes in the provinces.
So, even if Putin remains weakened, the Kremlin can look forward to getting rid of the notorious "Red Governors" of Bryansk, Volgograd and Voronezh through the normal workings of democracy; that is, if the Kremlin makes certain that votes in these regions are relatively honest. The same holds true in regions with well-known but wayward governors such as Kursk with Governor Rutskoi (who led the coup against Yeltsin of October, 1993) and Kaliningrad’s corrupt Governor Gorbenko.
But in those regions headed by strong politicians – Astrakhan, Chelyabinsk, Krasnodar and Stavropol regions, for example – the damage Putin has suffered in the past week makes it unlikely that he will be able to oust leaders who oppose him. In this, there is something vaguely reassuring. Presidential power it appears is now dependent on popular support, and isn’t the consent of the governed what democracy is all about? If this proves to be the case, perhaps the sailors of the Kursk will not have died in vain.
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With mainstream parties and politicians already preparing to accommodate the far right following this month's European Parliament election, the axiom of post-World War II European democracy has been quietly abandoned. “No collaboration with fascists" is being replaced by a tacit acceptance of them.
harbors no illusions about what the outcome of the European Parliament election means.
After eight decades of relative peace, the world is once again dividing into hostile economic and geopolitical blocs. The 80th anniversary of the invasion of Normandy offers a valuable opportunity to reflect on the principles we are willing to defend and the sacrifices we are prepared to make.
thinks understanding the causes and consequences of past global conflicts is crucial to preventing another one.
MOSCOW: Will the sinking of the submarine Kursk and the death of all its crew also sink the Putin revolution? Until now President Putin’s power was unique in Russian history – it was based on his vast popularity, one legitimized by the vote. He could browbeat Russia’s oligarchs into submission and recast the upper house of the Duma to make it bend to his will because he was universally popular and the other elements of Russia’s mostly discredited government knew it. His handling of the Kursk crisis, however, dented that democratic mandate because Putin seemed as contemptuous of human life as all his predecessors in the Kremlin. How well he recovers will determine whether or not Putin’s revolution will remain a democratic one, or whether he will revert to autocracy to pursue his goals.
I have no doubt that Putin will find people to blame for the failure to seek outside help for the Kursk in time. Indeed, the Kursk crisis may provide him with an opportunity to further clean house in the military. The first tests of his ability to recover are the looming regional elections across Russia. Between October and December over 40% of our country’s governorships will be up for grabs in new elections. As a restoration of Moscow’s authority over the country is a central plank in the president’s platform, he needs to restore his popularity fast.
Although Putin's reforms to the upper house of the Duma have already stripped the governors of their status as federal power brokers as well as of their parliamentary immunity, governorships retain wide powers in their regions. Few can now strut the national stage, or thumb their nose at the Kremlin, as they did during the Yeltsin era, but their powers are real and reigning them in won’t be easy.
Putin’s dominance has already changed the way these campaigns will be run. Money is now less important than even a year ago. What matters now is control over administrative power, and the appointment of presidential prefects throughout Russia gives the Kremlin a powerful hand in directing state administration. Since campaigns will be cheaper, governors will find it hard to buy reelection because opponents will be able to mount a credible opposition.
Even if a governor wants to buy an election, the sources of campaign cash are drying up. The oligarchs, who once sought close ties to regional bosses in hope of securing the help of governors in taking control of local factories, mines, and other assets, have been cowed by Putin. Indeed, the President’s blunt "message" to them is clear: stay out of politics. But if Russia’s richest men think the president damaged seriously, they may jump back into politics and fund his regional opponents.
Still, even if weakened, Putin benefits from a changed economy. Only 17.9% of potential voters now deem the country’s situation as "catastrophic", a much smaller proportion than at any time since communism’s end; only 15.6% say that they live below the poverty line. So the protest vote is falling. Moreover, economic growth is everywhere to be seen. In some places, the Chelyabinsk region, for example, it is up a whopping 25% on a year ago.
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The newest issue of our magazine, PS Quarterly: Age of Extremes, is here. To gain digital access to all of the magazine’s content, and receive your print copy, subscribe to PS Premium now.
Subscribe Now
This "economic miracle" in some parts of the Federation means that some regions have long since paid their pension and wage arrears. A democratic "feel good" factor is in play. Here, Putin has delivered something unique in Russian history: people are more satisfied with their government’s economic performance, not because of propaganda, but because their lives are visibly improving.
This means that the great battle of communists versus democratic reformers, that dominated every election since 1991, is a thing of the past. People do not care a bit about ideology. They are more concerned about prices, job opportunities, healthcare and education. They want a government that reflects their human values, as the response to the Kursk shows. Gripes about restrictions on freedom of expression or economic freedom, which are popular in Moscow, have few echoes in the provinces.
So, even if Putin remains weakened, the Kremlin can look forward to getting rid of the notorious "Red Governors" of Bryansk, Volgograd and Voronezh through the normal workings of democracy; that is, if the Kremlin makes certain that votes in these regions are relatively honest. The same holds true in regions with well-known but wayward governors such as Kursk with Governor Rutskoi (who led the coup against Yeltsin of October, 1993) and Kaliningrad’s corrupt Governor Gorbenko.
But in those regions headed by strong politicians – Astrakhan, Chelyabinsk, Krasnodar and Stavropol regions, for example – the damage Putin has suffered in the past week makes it unlikely that he will be able to oust leaders who oppose him. In this, there is something vaguely reassuring. Presidential power it appears is now dependent on popular support, and isn’t the consent of the governed what democracy is all about? If this proves to be the case, perhaps the sailors of the Kursk will not have died in vain.