The Russian and (now) American vision of "peace" in Ukraine would be no peace at all. The immediate task for Europe is not only to navigate Donald’s Trump unilateral pursuit of a settlement, but also to ensure that any deal does not increase the likelihood of an even wider war.
CHIŞINǍU – Peace is an attractive, yet elusive, concept. It can mean different things to different people at different times. Ukraine is a case in point. The quest for peace could yield either of two fundamentally different outcomes: a Vichy-style capitulation, perhaps with an interim ceasefire that buys Russia more time to rearm and prepare its next attack, or a robust defense of a frozen frontline, as one finds on the Korean Peninsula today.
The Kremlin’s vision for peace in Ukraine is clear. Russian forces would directly occupy swaths of illegally seized Ukrainian territory, and a compliant, helpless Ukrainian government (lacking any meaningful military capacity) would take orders from Moscow. Something quite similar happened in France during World War II, when the part of the country not under direct German occupation was run by General Philippe Pétain’s collaborationist government and took orders from Berlin.
Thus, for most of WWII – roughly between 1940 and 1944 – the situation on the ground in France was “peaceful.” The Vichy regime under Pétain regularly boasted that it had protected France, while blaming the Resistance – French guerrillas (maquis) – and periodic Allied bombing raids for any disturbances to the “peace.” This option has been on offer for Ukraine since the first hours of Russia’s large-scale invasion. Yet having witnessed the executions, rapes, and other atrocities committed by Russian forces against civilians in Bucha and elsewhere, the Ukrainians have understandably refused to capitulate.
The alternative is the type of peace that kept Germany peaceful for decades after WWII, and kept the Korean Peninsula peaceful since the 1953 armistice. In each case, the peace was secured by accepting de facto borders, which were fortified with massive defensive military buildups, boots on the ground, and credible security guarantees. While West Germany enjoyed NATO membership after 1955, South Korea relied on a bilateral alliance with the United States. Even today, the US keeps around 28,000 active-duty troops in South Korea and 50,000 in Germany.
Such backstops made the former wartime frontline almost impregnable, allowing each rump state to consolidate, develop, and remain at peace. The equivalent of a West German or South Korean model for Ukraine today would require a freezing of the frontline and either NATO accession or a deployment of tens of thousands of Western troops to its Ukrainian territory.
The French government has pushed for this kind of solution since February 2024, and it now features prominently in discussions among European leaders. With the new US administration demanding that Europe do more to ensure its own peace and security, at least a half-dozen European governments are said to be seriously considering it.
At a time of escalating global turmoil, there is an urgent need for incisive, informed analysis of the issues and questions driving the news – just what PS has always provided.
Subscribe to Digital or Digital Plus now to secure your discount.
Subscribe Now
Of course, if Europeans dislike the first model (a Vichy-style peace) but prove unable to deliver a sufficient security guarantee, that will create the conditions for a third possible scenario: a bogus peace leading to another war. A temporary ceasefire – like the one that prevailed under the Minsk agreements after 2014 – would allow Russia to regroup, rearm, and attack again sooner rather than later. Not only might this cycle be repeated more than once; it also could implicate countries beyond Ukraine – such as the Baltics or Poland.
Thus, if Ukraine does not get enough support in the coming months and years, Europe will find itself confronting a dangerous new strategic reality, one that would challenge NATO solidarity and leave EU territory perpetually vulnerable. With enough prodding and hybrid warfare, Russia could test the limits of NATO’s mutual defense guarantee and either expose it as a dead letter or precipitate a direct military confrontation between nuclear powers. Such would be the consequences of a bogus peace.
The immediate task for Europe, then, is not only to navigate US President Donald Trump’s unilateral pursuit of a settlement with Russia that could offer Ukraine on a platter to Russia, but also to ensure that any deal does not increase the likelihood of an even wider war in the near future.
Many Europeans think that if Russia could not conquer Ukraine in 2022, Russia would not dare challenge NATO and the European Union. That is dangerously wishful thinking. Occupying most of Ukraine would not only allow Russia to expand its territory, but also allow it to unite Europe’s biggest and second-biggest armies, under Kremlin command. Occupied territories bring in new people, defense production capacities, and resources – from rare-earth minerals to gas and nuclear power plants. Ukraine’s defense industrial capacity – which has been impressive in multiple areas, from sea drones to the shear capacity to produce equipment en masse – would be a welcome bonus for Russia as well, and it could be used against Europe. French President Emmanuel Macron already publicly warned that the combined armed forces of Russia and Ukraine would be unstoppable.
The bottom line is that avoiding a Ukrainian capitulation or a fake peace will require a European commitment to, at the very least, freezing the current frontline. Otherwise, vulnerable EU and NATO members could be the next targets. European public opinion must wake up to the reality that the only alternative is something that no one wants: a perpetual threat of war for much of Central and Northern Europe, with all the security and economic uncertainty that comes with it.
To have unlimited access to our content including in-depth commentaries, book reviews, exclusive interviews, PS OnPoint and PS The Big Picture, please subscribe
With German voters clearly demanding comprehensive change, the far right has been capitalizing on the public's discontent and benefiting from broader global political trends. If the country's democratic parties cannot deliver, they may soon find that they are no longer the mainstream.
explains why the outcome may decide whether the political “firewall” against the far right can hold.
The Russian and (now) American vision of "peace" in Ukraine would be no peace at all. The immediate task for Europe is not only to navigate Donald’s Trump unilateral pursuit of a settlement, but also to ensure that any deal does not increase the likelihood of an even wider war.
sees a Korea-style armistice with security guarantees as the only viable option in Ukraine.
Rather than engage in lengthy discussions to pry concessions from Russia, US President Donald Trump seems committed to giving the Kremlin whatever it wants to end the Ukraine war. But rewarding the aggressor and punishing the victim would amount to setting the stage for the next war.
warns that by punishing the victim, the US is setting up Europe for another war.
Within his first month back in the White House, Donald Trump has upended US foreign policy and launched an all-out assault on the country’s constitutional order. With US institutions bowing or buckling as the administration takes executive power to unprecedented extremes, the establishment of an authoritarian regime cannot be ruled out.
The rapid advance of AI might create the illusion that we have created a form of algorithmic intelligence capable of understanding us as deeply as we understand one another. But these systems will always lack the essential qualities of human intelligence.
explains why even cutting-edge innovations are not immune to the world’s inherent unpredictability.
CHIŞINǍU – Peace is an attractive, yet elusive, concept. It can mean different things to different people at different times. Ukraine is a case in point. The quest for peace could yield either of two fundamentally different outcomes: a Vichy-style capitulation, perhaps with an interim ceasefire that buys Russia more time to rearm and prepare its next attack, or a robust defense of a frozen frontline, as one finds on the Korean Peninsula today.
The Kremlin’s vision for peace in Ukraine is clear. Russian forces would directly occupy swaths of illegally seized Ukrainian territory, and a compliant, helpless Ukrainian government (lacking any meaningful military capacity) would take orders from Moscow. Something quite similar happened in France during World War II, when the part of the country not under direct German occupation was run by General Philippe Pétain’s collaborationist government and took orders from Berlin.
Thus, for most of WWII – roughly between 1940 and 1944 – the situation on the ground in France was “peaceful.” The Vichy regime under Pétain regularly boasted that it had protected France, while blaming the Resistance – French guerrillas (maquis) – and periodic Allied bombing raids for any disturbances to the “peace.” This option has been on offer for Ukraine since the first hours of Russia’s large-scale invasion. Yet having witnessed the executions, rapes, and other atrocities committed by Russian forces against civilians in Bucha and elsewhere, the Ukrainians have understandably refused to capitulate.
The alternative is the type of peace that kept Germany peaceful for decades after WWII, and kept the Korean Peninsula peaceful since the 1953 armistice. In each case, the peace was secured by accepting de facto borders, which were fortified with massive defensive military buildups, boots on the ground, and credible security guarantees. While West Germany enjoyed NATO membership after 1955, South Korea relied on a bilateral alliance with the United States. Even today, the US keeps around 28,000 active-duty troops in South Korea and 50,000 in Germany.
Such backstops made the former wartime frontline almost impregnable, allowing each rump state to consolidate, develop, and remain at peace. The equivalent of a West German or South Korean model for Ukraine today would require a freezing of the frontline and either NATO accession or a deployment of tens of thousands of Western troops to its Ukrainian territory.
The French government has pushed for this kind of solution since February 2024, and it now features prominently in discussions among European leaders. With the new US administration demanding that Europe do more to ensure its own peace and security, at least a half-dozen European governments are said to be seriously considering it.
Winter Sale: Save 40% on a new PS subscription
At a time of escalating global turmoil, there is an urgent need for incisive, informed analysis of the issues and questions driving the news – just what PS has always provided.
Subscribe to Digital or Digital Plus now to secure your discount.
Subscribe Now
Of course, if Europeans dislike the first model (a Vichy-style peace) but prove unable to deliver a sufficient security guarantee, that will create the conditions for a third possible scenario: a bogus peace leading to another war. A temporary ceasefire – like the one that prevailed under the Minsk agreements after 2014 – would allow Russia to regroup, rearm, and attack again sooner rather than later. Not only might this cycle be repeated more than once; it also could implicate countries beyond Ukraine – such as the Baltics or Poland.
Thus, if Ukraine does not get enough support in the coming months and years, Europe will find itself confronting a dangerous new strategic reality, one that would challenge NATO solidarity and leave EU territory perpetually vulnerable. With enough prodding and hybrid warfare, Russia could test the limits of NATO’s mutual defense guarantee and either expose it as a dead letter or precipitate a direct military confrontation between nuclear powers. Such would be the consequences of a bogus peace.
The immediate task for Europe, then, is not only to navigate US President Donald Trump’s unilateral pursuit of a settlement with Russia that could offer Ukraine on a platter to Russia, but also to ensure that any deal does not increase the likelihood of an even wider war in the near future.
Many Europeans think that if Russia could not conquer Ukraine in 2022, Russia would not dare challenge NATO and the European Union. That is dangerously wishful thinking. Occupying most of Ukraine would not only allow Russia to expand its territory, but also allow it to unite Europe’s biggest and second-biggest armies, under Kremlin command. Occupied territories bring in new people, defense production capacities, and resources – from rare-earth minerals to gas and nuclear power plants. Ukraine’s defense industrial capacity – which has been impressive in multiple areas, from sea drones to the shear capacity to produce equipment en masse – would be a welcome bonus for Russia as well, and it could be used against Europe. French President Emmanuel Macron already publicly warned that the combined armed forces of Russia and Ukraine would be unstoppable.
The bottom line is that avoiding a Ukrainian capitulation or a fake peace will require a European commitment to, at the very least, freezing the current frontline. Otherwise, vulnerable EU and NATO members could be the next targets. European public opinion must wake up to the reality that the only alternative is something that no one wants: a perpetual threat of war for much of Central and Northern Europe, with all the security and economic uncertainty that comes with it.