Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's resignation as chairman of Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) will deeply affect the distribution of forces within the German government and its slim "Red-Green" majority in Parliament. While it seems to be premature to speak, as some in Germany now do, of a "Twilight of the Chancellor" or to call Schröder's surprising step "the beginning of the end" of his tenure, it is perfectly correct to describe it as a dramatic loss of power.
The immediate winner is Franz Müntefering, age 64, the SPD's parliamentary floor leader who will succeed Schröder, as party chairman. Both politicians will constitute a tandem, but Schröder will be more dependent on Müntefering's loyalty than Müntefering is dependent on Schröder's success.
Schröder has been representing a moderately left political platform and agenda, one comparable to British Prime Minister Tony Blair's New Labour philosophy or former US President Bill Clinton's centrism. Müntefering, however, is more attached to traditional Social Democratic (or Old Labour) values. In terms of leadership style, Schröder is a soloist; Müntefering a team player.
In Germany, the Chancellor holds the strongest position among the key political players. However, the main source of any German Chancellor's strength is not to be found in the legal powers conferred upon him by the constitution; it is the actual support he holds within his own party.
With one notable exception in the 1950's, none of Germany's two main political parties - the Social Democrats and the moderately conservative Christian Democrats - has ever managed to win an absolute majority in Parliament. As a consequence, German Chancellors usually preside over coalition governments, and their effective authority is based on the loyalty of the party forces they command within such political alliances.
Although the Social Democrats never really liked Schröder (they certainly do not love him in the way they did the unforgettable Willy Brandt), they willy-nilly followed him so long as they saw him as the only guarantor of electoral success after 16 frustrating years (1982-1998) in opposition to Helmut Kohl. But this is no longer the case. Since the end of 2002, Schröder and the SPD have been facing unusually low public approval ratings - and this pattern is not likely to change soon.
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In 2003 alone, almost 40,000 Social Democrats left their party, a hemorrhaging previously unheard of. If national elections had, say, been held last Sunday, February 8, a centre-right coalition consisting of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals would have won 57% of the vote, according to "Infratest dimap," one of Germany's main polling institutes. With no more than 35% of the vote, Schröder's "Red-Green" coalition would have suffered a disaster.
At the beginning of what has been dubbed a "super election year" in Germany - with 14 elections, one at the European, five at the regional, and eight at the local levels - this is hideously bad news for the SPD.
Several times before, Schröder had been thoroughly energized by desperate situations when he stood with his back to the wall. This quality is his greatest strength, and it seems he has now embarked on his riskiest counteroffensive ever. It is based on the bet that there will be a considerable economic upswing from mid-2004 onwards until the next national elections in autumn 2006 - and that voters will attribute the expected recovery to the economic, labour market and welfare state reforms, called "Agenda 2010," that Schröder has made the hallmark of his chancellorship.
For a long time, Schröder's reformist rhetoric had not been matched by his politics. Only after his re-election in autumn 2002, did he give up his previous populist stance, short-term responses and neo-corporatist ways of trying to talk trade unions and employers' associations into compromise.
In view of Germany's most pressing problems - an accelerating demographic decline, an overregulated labour market, and a cloudy and confusing tax system - Schröder's reform agenda may look far too timid, but many cuts have been perceived as extremely cruel by the SPD's core constituency, especially the powerful labour unions.
But, given Germany's economic distress, which looks likely to worsen given the country's demographic problems, the Social Democrats are now condemned to give wealth creation priority over redistribution. Germany cannot afford to slow down or, worse yet, stop the reform process.
In the best case scenario, Schröder will therefore stick to the "Agenda 2010" philosophy, and Müntefering will patiently explain to a reluctant SPD that you have to cross the desert in order to make it to the Promised Land. In the worst case, Schröder will lapse back into populism for the sake of short-term electoral success, and Müntefering will confirm that method so as to save the wounded Social Democratic soul from total despair.
Schröder's tragedy is that his power may further erode whatever way he chooses. At the end of this current "super election year," we will know the answer.
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Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's resignation as chairman of Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) will deeply affect the distribution of forces within the German government and its slim "Red-Green" majority in Parliament. While it seems to be premature to speak, as some in Germany now do, of a "Twilight of the Chancellor" or to call Schröder's surprising step "the beginning of the end" of his tenure, it is perfectly correct to describe it as a dramatic loss of power.
The immediate winner is Franz Müntefering, age 64, the SPD's parliamentary floor leader who will succeed Schröder, as party chairman. Both politicians will constitute a tandem, but Schröder will be more dependent on Müntefering's loyalty than Müntefering is dependent on Schröder's success.
Schröder has been representing a moderately left political platform and agenda, one comparable to British Prime Minister Tony Blair's New Labour philosophy or former US President Bill Clinton's centrism. Müntefering, however, is more attached to traditional Social Democratic (or Old Labour) values. In terms of leadership style, Schröder is a soloist; Müntefering a team player.
In Germany, the Chancellor holds the strongest position among the key political players. However, the main source of any German Chancellor's strength is not to be found in the legal powers conferred upon him by the constitution; it is the actual support he holds within his own party.
With one notable exception in the 1950's, none of Germany's two main political parties - the Social Democrats and the moderately conservative Christian Democrats - has ever managed to win an absolute majority in Parliament. As a consequence, German Chancellors usually preside over coalition governments, and their effective authority is based on the loyalty of the party forces they command within such political alliances.
Although the Social Democrats never really liked Schröder (they certainly do not love him in the way they did the unforgettable Willy Brandt), they willy-nilly followed him so long as they saw him as the only guarantor of electoral success after 16 frustrating years (1982-1998) in opposition to Helmut Kohl. But this is no longer the case. Since the end of 2002, Schröder and the SPD have been facing unusually low public approval ratings - and this pattern is not likely to change soon.
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At a time of escalating global turmoil, there is an urgent need for incisive, informed analysis of the issues and questions driving the news – just what PS has always provided.
Subscribe to Digital or Digital Plus now to secure your discount.
Subscribe Now
In 2003 alone, almost 40,000 Social Democrats left their party, a hemorrhaging previously unheard of. If national elections had, say, been held last Sunday, February 8, a centre-right coalition consisting of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals would have won 57% of the vote, according to "Infratest dimap," one of Germany's main polling institutes. With no more than 35% of the vote, Schröder's "Red-Green" coalition would have suffered a disaster.
At the beginning of what has been dubbed a "super election year" in Germany - with 14 elections, one at the European, five at the regional, and eight at the local levels - this is hideously bad news for the SPD.
Several times before, Schröder had been thoroughly energized by desperate situations when he stood with his back to the wall. This quality is his greatest strength, and it seems he has now embarked on his riskiest counteroffensive ever. It is based on the bet that there will be a considerable economic upswing from mid-2004 onwards until the next national elections in autumn 2006 - and that voters will attribute the expected recovery to the economic, labour market and welfare state reforms, called "Agenda 2010," that Schröder has made the hallmark of his chancellorship.
For a long time, Schröder's reformist rhetoric had not been matched by his politics. Only after his re-election in autumn 2002, did he give up his previous populist stance, short-term responses and neo-corporatist ways of trying to talk trade unions and employers' associations into compromise.
In view of Germany's most pressing problems - an accelerating demographic decline, an overregulated labour market, and a cloudy and confusing tax system - Schröder's reform agenda may look far too timid, but many cuts have been perceived as extremely cruel by the SPD's core constituency, especially the powerful labour unions.
But, given Germany's economic distress, which looks likely to worsen given the country's demographic problems, the Social Democrats are now condemned to give wealth creation priority over redistribution. Germany cannot afford to slow down or, worse yet, stop the reform process.
In the best case scenario, Schröder will therefore stick to the "Agenda 2010" philosophy, and Müntefering will patiently explain to a reluctant SPD that you have to cross the desert in order to make it to the Promised Land. In the worst case, Schröder will lapse back into populism for the sake of short-term electoral success, and Müntefering will confirm that method so as to save the wounded Social Democratic soul from total despair.
Schröder's tragedy is that his power may further erode whatever way he chooses. At the end of this current "super election year," we will know the answer.