The contest between former US President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris underscores a stark contrast of policies and priorities on virtually every major issue, from economic policy to reproductive freedom to climate change. But Trump and Harris – like most Americans – seem to agree on one thing: China poses a serious threat to US interests and must be contained.

China’s leaders are well aware of this view, explains Ian Bremmer, Founder and President of Eurasia Group and GZERO Media. But while they expect either US administration to be “antagonistic,” they seem especially anxious about a second Trump presidency, which would be more likely to bring a “further closure of US markets.” Whether they will respond with “relative quiescence” or a “more aggressive strategy” remains to be seen.

As Northwestern University’s Nancy Qian points out, it is not only China that will suffer if a new Trump administration imposes “sweeping tariffs” against the country. Such a policy, together with Trump’s other tax proposals, could cost Americans $500 billion per year, with the burden “borne disproportionately by lower-income households, which rely more on cheap imports.” If Chinese and US leaders want to avoid “tremendous economic losses for their people,” they will need to “recognize each other’s aims and limitations.”

But Yale’s Stephen S. Roach sees potential for a course correction. Yes, if Trump wins, he will “lead with tariffs” (which “will backfire”), and Harris does not seem “predisposed toward ending the US-China conflict.” But Harris’s selection of Minnesota Governor Tim Walz as a running mate could be a game-changer. Given Walz’s experience in China and engaged interest in the country when he served in Congress, a Harris-Walz administration may well “prioritize re-engagement,” potentially delivering a breakthrough “equivalent to Richard Nixon’s rapprochement with China 52 years ago.”

NEW YORK – How will the Communist Party of China (CPC) react to America’s highly unpredictable election in November? China is convinced that the desire to stunt its natural growth and contain its legitimate exercise of global influence is one of the few points of agreement between Democrats and Republicans. Their only disagreement, Chinese leaders believe, is about which economic and political weapons to use to contain China, and how and when to use them.

This view should come as no surprise in Washington. After all, US President Joe Biden followed the Trump administration in imposing new tariffs and restrictions on technology exports, while also expanding anti-China alliances with partners like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and even India.

But this is not to suggest that China views the two parties as effectively the same. On the contrary, it appears to be preparing to meet the challenges that would come with a second Donald Trump presidency. Trump remains a slight favorite to win, and China’s leaders believe it is more important to prepare early for a new Trump administration than for a victory by the Democrats’ presumptive nominee, Vice President Kamala Harris.

China’s desire for stability – both in relations with the United States and in the international system more generally – remains strong, because its economy has been slow to re-emerge from the traumas inflicted by the CPC’s draconian lockdown policies during the COVID-19 pandemic. The official line from Chinese authorities is that a further closure of US markets – which is more likely if Trump wins – would force China to double down on strengthening its own consumer markets and shifting toward other foreign markets. The implication is that China itself would not escalate a trade war.

China has laid the groundwork for better inter-governmental and inter-military communication with the US. But CPC officials are also trying to figure out whether Trump intends to make good on his latest threat of 60% tariffs on all Chinese exports as part of a broader decoupling strategy, or is simply trying to squeeze China for better trade and investment terms. Their biggest worry is that Trump will revoke China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations status, which would amount to a reversal of the deal that brought China into the World Trade Organization, sustained US-China economic relations for more than a generation, and laid the foundation for its rise.

Chinese leaders could just try to take the pain imposed by Trump’s salvos, in the hopes that America’s own economic weakness and China’s unwillingness to put up a fight might persuade him to pick another foreign target. Alternatively, they could appeal to various US allies that remain dependent on good economic relations with China. In exchange for offering these countries greater market access, Chinese leaders would press them to lobby the Trump White House for a less confrontational approach (or to align themselves more with China if they, too, are targeted by “America First” policies).

But absorbing more economic pain when growth is already weak risks alienating Chinese consumers, who might turn their anger toward the CPC leadership. The bigger risk, then, is that China’s leaders conclude that the limited engagement of the past year has not produced good results, and that the next hostile US president will always be just one election away.

If that is their view, they might respond to US economic pressure (regardless of who is in the White House) with a more assertive security policy. In this scenario, if the US really does become more aggressive in decoupling from China’s economy, it could find that it has much less leverage to pressure China to back away from its military and diplomatic campaign against Taiwan.

True, the CPC could also adopt a friendlier approach designed to make anti-China policies less politically popular in the US. For example, if China pledged to invest in production and job creation in the US, and if it negotiated a deal to limit exports to some mutually agreeable level, it could create new leverage to influence US policy.

But Chinese officials know that Trump might view such moves as a sign of weakness, leading him to double down on his pressure strategy. And even if Trump or Harris were to pursue such an agreement, there is no guarantee that the next US president wouldn’t tear it up and demand a new one. Nor is it clearly to China’s advantage to hew closer to US positions on the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. After all, an end to those conflicts might allow the US to turn even more attention to “getting tough on China.”

The most likely scenario for 2025 is a period of tension in which China’s leadership and a new administration in Washington weigh each other’s strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps the best that each side can hope for is that today’s economic uncertainty will encourage pragmatism on both sides, limiting additional damage to the world’s most important bilateral relationship.

CHICAGO – With Donald Trump still leading in polls ahead of the US presidential election, many are wondering how a second Trump administration would approach China. Trump’s stance on purely political issues is unclear. He recently remarked that Taiwan should pay for US defense, hinting at an unwillingness to defend the island from attack by China, even as his former – and perhaps future – advisers advocate a large military buildup in Asia. But Trump’s economic approach to China is much less ambiguous: the two countries are competitors, and America must win.

In this sense, Trump and the Republican Party are not so different from US President Joe Biden and the Democratic Party. The Biden-Harris administration kept most of Trump’s China tariffs, and intensified the focus on the high-tech sector – particularly electric vehicles and batteries, which China has come to dominate. Politicians in both major parties have expressed concerns that the United States’ national security could be jeopardized should it be unable to manufacture its own clean tech, and that it could fall further behind in an industry that is important for the renewables-based economy of the future.

In his second presidential run, Trump has proposed more tariffs: a 10% tariff on every import, a 60% tariff on all Chinese imports, and a 100% tariff on all cars made outside the US. This worries many economists because these sweeping tariffs, along with Trump’s other tax proposals, could cost Americans $500 billion per year, a burden that would be borne disproportionately by lower-income households, which rely more on cheap imports.

Observers may wonder whether the resulting economic headwinds would prevent the US from imposing such high tariffs were Trump to return to the White House. The answer is probably no. History suggests why the government would forge ahead with a policy agenda that would harm average Americans.

The US has always valued being on the technological frontier. After World War I and World War II, when other Allied countries sought land and money as war reparations from Germany, the US focused on securing German patents to boost American innovation. And it worked: access to German intellectual property after WWI significantly increased US patents in organic chemistry, a field in which the Germans were world leaders at the time.

A more recent example was the US-Japan trade war of the 1980s. Back then, many Americans viewed Japan’s rising market share in the semiconductor and automotive sectors as a threat to the US economy. To address concerns over the “dumping” of these goods, American leaders pursued exceptionally aggressive policies against Japan.

For starters, the Democratic administration of President Jimmy Carter requested that Japanese automakers build factories in the US. Following that, the Republican administration of President Ronald Reagan imposed 100% tariffs on $300 million worth of Japanese imports in 1987.

The two trade wars are similar. Back then, like now, the US government sought to secure America’s economic supremacy, an agenda that commanded strong popular support across the political spectrum, despite large net losses to American consumers and firms. The tariffs imposed by the US in both instances violated international rules set by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its successor, the World Trade Organization. Even the recent political rhetoric against China, which warns of future military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, echoes the Japan-bashing of the 1980s, which often harkened back to WWII.

But there are important differences between the two cases. Japan depended entirely on the US for its military defense in the 1980s. American political leaders were therefore confident that any pressure campaign – whether reasonable or not – would ultimately be successful. There is no such assurance with China.

China’s ability to respond to US demands is also limited by its domestic concerns. In 1990, per capita income in Japan and the US was at a similar level, whereas Chinese per capita income is much less, currently around 17% of the US level. The Chinese government has invested heavily in lifting its population into the middle class and establishing itself as a global leader in high-tech sectors, which will limit its room for maneuver.

At a time of huge political uncertainty, one thing is clear: the US government will maintain its aggressive stance toward China, a policy that, as with Japan in the 1980s, has bipartisan support. But while Japan conceded to most of America’s demands, China may not be willing or able to be so obliging. Chinese and US leaders will need to recognize each other’s aims and limitations if they want to avoid tremendous economic losses for their people.

NEW HAVEN – Fifty years ago this month, Richard Nixon resigned as US president. With all eyes on November’s presidential election, the anniversary provides an occasion to consider the inherent contradictions of American political leadership.

Nixon’s abuses of executive power contrasted sharply with his foreign-policy achievements. As an avowed anti-communist, he surprised the world by going to China in 1972. Nixon’s triangulation strategy effectively isolated the former Soviet Union, ultimately helping to bring the Cold War to an end.

Could such a breakthrough happen again? The looming superpower clash between the United States and China certainly begs for another strategic breakthrough. The two countries, fueled by politically driven false narratives, are on a collision course with no realistic off-ramp. It wouldn’t take much – an incident in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, or an escalation of US containment policy — to trigger conflict escalation.

Donald Trump, should he win in November, seems unlikely to resolve the US-China conflict. As he did in his first administration, he intends to lead with tariffs. Trump has proposed raising US tariffs on Chinese imports to between 50-60% after having raised them during his first administration from 3% in early 2018 to 19% in 2020.

As was the case with Trump’s earlier tariffs, this effort would backfire. For starters, tariffs are a tax on Chinese exporters that raise prices for US consumers. According to recent research by the Peterson Institute of International Economics, the additional costs from Trump’s new proposed tariffs would be at least 1.8% of GDP, nearly five times those caused by his first round of tariffs.

Second, as I have long argued, tariffs on China do not reduce the overall trade deficit for a savings-short US economy. Instead, they shift the deficit to other, largely higher-cost, foreign producers. That is what happened after Trump’s initial tariffs: the bilateral imbalance with China shrank, but increased deficits with Mexico, Vietnam, Canada, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Ireland, and Germany were more than offsetting.

Kamala Harris, by contrast, appears to have no intention to up the ante on tariffs. But she does seem inclined to endorse Joe Biden’s “small yard, high fence” doctrine, which Chinese President Xi Jinping has described as the “all-around containment, encirclement, and suppression” of China. That would include a continuation of Biden’s tariffs (largely carried over from Trump), targeted sanctions, along with de-risking and friend-shoring strategies. While less aggressive than Trump’s potential mega-tariffs, the anti-China approach that Harris inherits from Biden would hardly de-escalate tensions.

The two candidates seem likely to hold different views on Taiwan. In a late June interview with Bloomberg Businessweek, Trump emphasized a more transactional approach to defending Taiwan against China. He argued that, like an insurance premium, “Taiwan should pay us for defense.” Trump has previously taken the same stance– that wealthy countries should pay for US protection – with Europe, NATO, and even Japan.

I am not in favor of a mercenary approach to American foreign policy. But I must concede that Trump’s tactics could well shift the burden of deterring China from the US to Taiwan. This could be a positive development, to the extent that it reduces direct tensions between the two superpowers. But it would still be far from a strategic recipe for conflict resolution.

While neither Trump nor Harris are predisposed toward ending the US-China conflict, there is a potential twist that hints at a Nixonian breakthrough with China: Harris’s selection of Minnesota Governor Tim Walz as a running mate.

Like former US President George H.W. Bush, who served as Chief of the US Liaison Office in Beijing in 1974-75, Walz has a special connection with China. He first traveled there as a teacher in 1989, during the tragic events in Tiananmen Square, which shaped his views on what he later described as China’s “unthinkable” tendencies. Walz even chose to get married on June 4, 1994, the fifth anniversary of the Tiananmen tragedy.

In light of that experience, Walz focused on Chinese human-rights issues while serving as a congressman from 2007-19. He supported a resolution commemorating the 20th anniversary of June 1989 as well as congressional actions sympathetic to Chinese activists, including Chen Guangcheng, Liu Xiaobo, and pro-democracy groups in Tibet and Hong Kong.

But, in addition to his concerns about human rights and Chinese military aggression in the South China Sea, Walz has also stressed the importance of a sustainable US-China relationship, arguing that dialogue is essential and “absolutely has to happen.” In other words, he would bring a pragmatism that is sorely missing from America’s increasingly Sinophobic stance toward China.

Vice presidents rarely shape major policy initiatives. But in this case, Walz’s views on China raise the chances of a Nixon-like initiative by a Harris administration. Harris and Walz share concerns about Chinese human rights and South China Sea tensions. But they also recognize the need to face the urgent imperative for a course correction in a troubled Sino-American relationship.

This nuanced perspective would allow them to walk and chew gum at the same time. It would encourage them to prioritize re-engagement over digging in their heels at every point of friction in a conflicted relationship. That’s what freed Nixon to put aside his ideological biases and engage China in 1972. Walz might well help tip the scales for Harris’s China policy.

Many of today’s geostrategic circumstances are eerily similar to the Cold War climate a half-century ago. Who better than a thoughtful new US president to mitigate a dangerous dynamic with another superpower and shift the relationship from adversarial to competitive, from conflict escalation to conflict resolution?

Under the watch of Trump and Biden, America’s China problem went from bad to worse. If Harris prevails in November, that need not be the case.