While Donald Trump's capricious approach to politics always lent an air of unpredictability to his previous four years in the White House, he has now had another four years to nurse his resentments – and to plan. What will he and his "cadres" do now that they have their hands back on the levers of American power?
After the 2020 US election, it took days for major news networks to project the winner of the presidential race, and many more weeks for Americans – and the world – to know if there would be a peaceful and orderly transition of power. There wasn’t. The incumbent, Donald Trump, conspired to overturn the results, and then encouraged a mob of his followers to storm the US Capitol.
In 2024, Americans – and the world – have been spared that agonizing uncertainty, but will now confront instability in a more virulent form, because voters in the United States have handed Trump (now a convicted felon) and his party a decisive victory. How did it happen, and what does the outcome portend? Below, Project Syndicate commentators consider what another Trump presidency will mean for the US and global economies, domestic policy, and the future of democracy.
RUTH BEN-GHIAT
With Donald Trump’s desire to be a dictator so central to his persona and his political platform, the 2024 election was a referendum on whether Americans want to continue to live in a democracy, or prefer some form of “strongman” rule. They chose the latter.
Of course, many who voted for Trump would say that they based their decision on his promise to bring down the price of eggs; because there are too many illegal immigrants in America; or because cities are overrun with crime and homeless people. But make no mistake: Trump’s campaign was a rehearsal for autocracy, featuring praise for foreign dictators as models of leadership, warnings about the “enemy within” (meaning his political opponents), and a depiction of America as a failed democratic experiment – the “garbage can of the world.”
Authoritarians often tell you what they are going to do – both as a means of intimidating those who would resist and to condition the broader public for what is coming. Based on what Trump has said, we should prepare for a declaration of a state of emergency on or around “Day One” (the codeword used by Trump’s MAGA movement and its policy blueprint, Project 2025, for an authoritarian takeover). The trumped-up justification could be (non-existent) threats from the “radical Marxist left,” (non-existent) “immigrant invasions,” or some (non-existent) conspiracy hatched by the Democratic “enemy within” and foreign “globalist warmongers.”
Under this state of exception, Trump’s bureaucratic “army” (Project 2025’s label for its cadre of politicized civil servants) can then be deployed to “dismantle the administrative state,” thus completing the destruction of America’s liberal democratic institutions of governance. Over time, there would be steady suppression of reproductive and voting rights; a constant threat of political violence; unrestrained oligarchic plunder of public resources; soaring economic inequality; investigations of critics that end with imprisonment (or perhaps execution by firing squad – a recurrent Trump fantasy); and perhaps deployment of the military against protesters and to carry out mass deportations.
These abuses are familiar from the history of authoritarianism. Now, America will experience them first-hand.
Ruth Ben-Ghiat, Professor of History and Italian Studies at New York University, is the author of Strongmen: Mussolini to the Present(W.W. Norton & Company, 2020).
JEFFREY FRANKEL
The two domains that worry me the most are misguided US foreign policy and long-run damage to norms of truth, democracy, and respect for the rule of law. But these areas are not top priorities for much of the American public. Rather, voters have consistently reported to be most concerned with the economy. They asked, “Are we better off than we were four years ago” and answered with a firm “no.” This is itself remarkable, since in November 2020 COVID-19 deaths were running at 10,000 per week, and unemployment was 6.7%, versus 4.1% today.
One hears variousexplanations for the public’s perception of poor economic performance. Perhaps the most common is the observation that inflation under Joe Biden has been higher than it was during Donald Trump’s first term. But most of the economic policies that Trump has campaigned on can be expected to put upward pressure on prices, assuming he follows through on them. These policies include challenges to the Federal Reserve’s independence and pressure for lower interest rates; depreciation of the dollar, to counter supposed undervaluation of trading partners’ currencies; large tax cuts that are not paid for, with the result that they widen the budget deficit; sharp increases in tariff rates, to 60% on all imports from China and up to 20% on all other imports; and mass deportation of undocumented immigrants and restrictions on legal immigration.
If this prediction of higher inflation during the coming four years is borne out, will US voters take note? Will Trump supporters forget in 2028 how they voted in 2024?
Jeffrey Frankel, Professor of Capital Formation and Growth at Harvard University, served as a member of President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers. He is a research associate at the US National Bureau of Economic Research.
JAMES K. GALBRAITH
I went to bed early election night, unsurprised by the outcome. Among the reasons: prices, interest rates, wars, genocide, a case of dementia, and an empty campaign whose main theme was “Oh no! Not the other guy!”
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Donald Trump may be old, angry, and erratic, but he is not empty. Kamala Harris projected the void. Her presidency would have been in the hands of advisers – people like Paul Krugman or Liz Cheney. If Harris had charted a course of her own, she might have won; but if she had been capable of that, Joe Biden would not have picked her for vice president four years ago.
On the “glorious” economy, Krugman stated the Democratic ticket’s case: Growth is “a remarkable success,” inflation “looks beaten,” and “claims that we have a bad economy are about as credible as claims that armed migrants have taken over Times Square.” There was just one problem: checking their kitchens and their bank accounts, it appears that millions of voters disagreed.
Over at the Institute for New Economic Thinking, Thomas Ferguson makes a strong argument: Until the pandemic, the Trump years brought income gains for American workers, and COVID-19 relief reinforced those gains; but then price increases took them away. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve fed a “wealth-effect” boom in consumption by the rich, and then high interest rates froze the housing market for everyone else.
The great mystery of this election, as of now, is that Trump’s overall vote barely changed from 2020 to 2024, while the drop-off from Biden to Harris was around 13 million votes (from 81 to 68 million). That’s a huge – and very unbalanced – change. What happened? We don’t know, but the question should be posed and answered.
James K. Galbraith, Professor of Government and Chair in Government/Business Relations at the University of Texas at Austin, is co-author (with Jing Chen) of the forthcoming Entropy Economics: The Living Basis of Value and Production (University of Chicago Press, 2025).
AZIZ HUQ
Americans voted for their pocketbooks and not with their conscience. Among the values set aside in the 2024 presidential election were humanity, decency, democracy, and the rule of law.
It may seem paradoxical, or even contradictory, to say that “democracy” lost in a vote that yielded, if nothing else, a clear snapshot of popular sentiment and a corresponding presidential choice. But there is nothing odd, or incoherent, about saying that a democratic choice can undermine democracy – the twentieth century saw a lot of that. It is entirely possible for a polity to choose a candidate or party that has demonstrated, and then loudly reiterated, its refusal to abide by the established rules of democratic competition, and its determination to use the awesome power of the government to overwhelm or handicap its opponents.
The now thoroughly Trumpian Republican Party has shown no hesitation in using rhetoric and violence that scorns the idea of mutual tolerance and forbearance. Expect that political movement to entrench itself in, and transform, the federal government into a tool not just for its policies but more generally for its enduring hegemony. Expect the rule of law to be bent increasingly into an instrument for turning whim into command, without any prospect that power will be bridled in ways that make it predictable rather than arbitrary.
There will be talk in the coming weeks or months about whether America’s democratic institutions are likely to prove resilient. It is important to observe that these institutions have already failed an important test: There are a range of legal mechanisms that are meant to prevent an incumbent president from violating the public’s trust, and existing laws, to stay in power. Impeachment, disqualification for “insurrection” or “rebellion,” and criminal prosecution – all failed. They failed as a means to bolt in the rule of law. And they failed as signals of unfitness for office.
On the back of that failure, the public has now repudiated those votes against Donald Trump by using their own votes to re-elect him. What remains may be resilient, but whether it is enough to count as “democracy” remains to be seen.
Donald Trump and the Republicans have decisively won a free and fair election. Democracy is very good at picking up on voters’ most passionate concerns. Americans were worried about inflation and immigration, and though democracy was also a big issue, the manner in which Vice President Kamala Harris was installed as the Democratic Party’s nominee following President Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the race did raise eyebrows. The Democrats will undoubtedly engage in a painful postmortem of the failure to insist on a more democratic nominating process at their Chicago convention.
Unfortunately, though democracy is good at highlighting anxieties, it is not necessarily good at producing the best remedies. Americans are worried about price increases, but Trump’s proposed tariffs would make many goods even more expensive. Appliances, electronics, and clothing will all cost more, and American farmers – a key constituency in some states – will be hit hard when other countries retaliate. Everyone, including America, will suffer from a trade war.
Trade has been a central concern for Trump since the 1980s, when he was passionate about a supposed Japanese threat to take over the world. But this was always a blinkered view of the economic transformation that occurred in the late twentieth century, and Trump’s zero-sum mentality will do nothing to help Americans today. Similarly, his threat to expel undocumented immigrants – many of them employed in jobs Americans won’t do – is unlikely to reduce price pressures or create more jobs for US citizens.
The new administration will inevitably blame the US Federal Reserve, rather than its own policies, for any renewed monetary turbulence. Meanwhile, the fiscal legacy of the global financial crisis, Trump’s first term, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Biden’s own spending policies will remain. Without a clear, coherent fiscal plan, a rising share of the budget will go toward debt service unless the administration succeeds in bullying the Fed to hold down interest rates. But if that happens, we can expect far higher inflation, and we can say goodbye to the dollar’s dominant position in the world financial system.
Donald Trump’s decisive victory answers, at least for now, a central question that was looming over the election: Will the political center hold? The answer, clearly, is no – and not just in the United States. Trump’s win does not auger well for the political center globally, including in Europe, where the ideological extremes continue to gain ground. Many of the world’s democracies appear headed for a prolonged period of polarization and illiberal populism, with the US leading the way.
Trump’s return to power should therefore serve as a wake-up call, prompting urgent efforts to tackle the factors that have hollowed out political centrism and fueled the growth of a strident populism. Those steps must address two key challenges.
First, in the aftermath of the erosion of the social contract of the industrial era, the US needs to rebuild its middle class. Trump has promised to do so, turning to protective tariffs aimed at turning the US back into a “manufacturing powerhouse.” But protectionist barriers would not only risk blowing up the global economy; they would also fail to solve the problem.
In an era of digitization and automation, the scale of any conceivable manufacturing turnaround will not come close to what would be required to return a broad swath of working Americans to the middle class. Instead, the US government needs to work with the private sector to fashion an education and employment ecosystem that will enable working Americans to earn a living wage as automation, artificial intelligence, and other technologies evolve. Much of this effort needs to focus on creating and filling well-paid jobs in the service sector, where most Americans will work – and where roughly 80% of the US workforce is already employed. The same goes for other advanced economies.
Second, Trump needs to work with Congress to overhaul the nation’s broken immigration system. The influx of migrants across the southern border has been a major source of both polarization and electoral discontent. It is past time to enact legislation that secures the border, establishes an orderly and streamlined system for processing legal immigration, and charts a humane pathway for resolving the status of millions of undocumented migrants. Many other democracies, particularly in Europe, similarly need to tackle immigration reform.
As for the global impact of his return to power, Trump promises to be far more unilateralist than isolationist. The world should be ready for a fiercely transactional foreign policy; foreign leaders should understand that they will be dealing with a real-estate mogul, not a statesman. Allies will need to spend more on their own defense to stay in Trump’s good graces. Ukraine had better get ready to seek a diplomatic endgame to its fight against Russian aggression. Israel may have a freer hand as it seeks to take down the “axis of resistance,” but it had better ready a postwar peace plan that will be to Trump’s liking. Allies and adversaries alike should get ready for a raft of new US tariffs, but they may be able to negotiate trade deals that strike Trump’s fancy, thereby helping prevent the fragmentation of the global economy.
Trump won a commanding victory. We may lament that outcome, but we need to try to make the most of it.
Charles A. Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, served on the National Security Council under Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama.
CARLA NORRLÖF
The economy was a major issue in this election, but it operated within a broader context in which perceived leadership qualities and demographic factors contributed to Donald Trump’s success. Exit polls indicate that 52% of voters trust Trump more to handle the economy, a perspective likely bolstered by positive income growth across all income groups during his previous tenure. Moreover, Trump was overwhelmingly favored among the 30% of voters who value a candidate with the “ability to lead,” and among the 28% who want someone who “can bring needed change.”
Many Americans vote their wallets. The bottom income quintile (those earning less than $30,000 per year) has experienced higher income growth under Joe Biden, and favored Kamala Harris. Voters in the second and third quintiles ($30,000-$99,999) experienced higher income growth during Trump’s previous administration, and favored Trump this time. Inflation likely eroded the purchasing power of their gains, leading to economic dissatisfaction. Among voters who felt that their family’s financial situation is worse now than four years ago, 81% supported Trump, suggesting that subjective perceptions of economic hardship may have outweighed actual income statistics.
Harris also faced unique challenges that may have affected voters’ perception of her. The scrutiny she encountered overshadowed her substantive contributions and messaging on issues like immigration, health care, and equity. Media narratives often underreported her achievements, while focusing on controversies or perceived shortcomings. As in 2016, Trump relied on simple, catchy language and anecdotes to tap into voters’ anxieties about the economy and immigration. He was well positioned to promise a return to the income growth that was achieved during his first term, and to respond forcefully to what are generally agreed to be significant challenges on the southern border.
Trump also ruthlessly attacked Harris’s credibility and relied on racist and sexist stereotypes – going so far as to call her “stupid” and “low IQ.” And yet he has faced numerous indictments and allegations related to sexual misconduct, tax fraud, obstruction of justice, election interference, and incitement of the January 6, 2021, insurrection. It is a testament to his extraordinary ability to evade any consequences that voters nonetheless perceive him as a credible leader.
Carla Norrlöf, Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
CECILIA ELENA ROUSE
Based on his campaign, Donald Trump’s economic agenda will center on extending some or all of the expiring 2017 tax cuts, reducing other individual and business taxes, strengthening national defense, and addressing immigration. If you add in other campaign proposals (including some that would raise revenue), the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimates that Trump’s agenda would add $7.75 trillion to the United States’ projected national debt through 2035. This would be on top of the $26 trillion of debt already held by the public, which the Congressional Budget Office estimates will increase to more than $50 trillion by 2034 even without Trump’s proposals.
The US federal government does not have an official “budget constraint,” but such a large federal debt burden will certainly fuel pressure to cut spending. The question is what and where to cut. In 2023, discretionary spending – such as outlays for defense, transportation, veterans’ benefits, and education – comprised only about one-quarter of the budget. This is spending that must be appropriated each year and is negotiated as part of the budget process. Most of the spending is on entitlement programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security (as well as a few others), which are mandated by law. Without completely gutting discretionary spending, there is not enough room to enact Trump’s desired agenda and have an appropriately sized federal budget.
And how to make space for new priorities? Unless policymakers are willing to reform entitlement programs and find additional sources of revenue, there will be very little fiscal space for policies needed to boost economic productivity – such as by investing in new infrastructure or finding ways to support an aging workforce. Furthermore, increasing the US federal debt promises to be inflationary, which will exacerbate many Americans’ economic woes. Trump will face many challenges during his second term, and policymakers can address them only if they have some fiscal breathing room to launch reforms.
Cecilia Elena Rouse, former chair of US President Joe Biden’s Council of Economic Advisers, is President of the Brookings Institution.
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER
In 2008, Barack Obama won the presidency on a platform of hope and change, running on a political manifesto entitled The Audacity of Hope and a theme song called “Yes We Can.” Kamala Harris tried the same strategy this year, looking forward and trying to turn the page on an era of division and growing hate. This time fear triumphed over hope.
The majority of Americans are just too angry. Men are angry that they are being pushed aside, losing their traditional roles of breadwinner, protector, and leader. Young people are angry that they cannot afford the middle-class lifestyle – a house, children, cars, and vacations – that their parents had. Rural Americans are deeply angry at the elites on the coasts and in the big cities, the people in power who dismiss them as uneducated and provincial.
Americans across the country are angry at prices – for groceries, transportation, medication, childcare, and other necessities – that have often reached absurd levels and make it impossible to live the way they once did. Uber and Lyft introduced themselves a decade ago as alternatives to expensive taxis; today even short rides cost between $30 and $50 in many cities. Americans who are experiencing rapid demographic change are angry at the immigrants whom they perceive to be taking over and remaking the country.
Women are angry too, at losing control of their own bodies. But their anger was not enough to turn the tide.
Anger often reflects fear, and there is plenty to be afraid of in a deeply uncertain and violent world. It also reflects the persistent sense that America itself – its infrastructure, health system, borders, and the political system – is broken. Notwithstanding Joe Biden’s many successes, Donald Trump’s dark visions captured the national mood. He won as an angry battering ram of change, aimed at the system itself.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former director of policy planning in the US State Department, is CEO of the think tank New America, Professor Emerita of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and the author of Renewal: From Crisis to Transformation in Our Lives, Work, and Politics(Princeton University Press, 2021).
LAURA TYSON
On most macroeconomic indicators – GDP growth, unemployment, (declining) inflation, business investment, the stock market, and real (inflation-adjusted) wage growth – the US economy is the envy of the world. Yet millions of voters in red (Republican-leaning) and blue (Democratic) states and across demographic groups voted for Donald Trump, because they are deeply angry that the economy has not delivered for them. They want a change in direction – an economy that delivers gains for everyone.
But, under Trump, they will not get what they want. They will get tax cuts that disproportionately benefit the rich, paid for by eviscerating cuts to the Affordable Care Act, Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and other key middle-class programs. They will get larger federal budget deficits, and thus higher interest rates. They will get big across-the-board increases in tariffs that drive up prices, particularly for low- and middle-income consumers. The overall US economy will be dragged down by a stronger dollar, retaliatory tariffs imposed by trading partners, and the business uncertainty resulting from Trump’s plans to upend the rules and change or terminate programs across all major government agencies. Trump’s economic agenda is a recipe for stagflation and growing wage and income inequality.
Moreover, the Republicans’ plan to curtail reproductive rights for women will have negative economic consequences for women and their families. Despite historic storms and fires, Trump will walk away from the Inflation Reduction Act’s effective, business-friendly incentives to advance the clean-energy transition (even though red states have benefited disproportionately from these policies). In economic relations with China, Trump might adopt a “transactional art-of-the-deal” approach, negotiating bilateral agreements that reduce the US trade deficit. His oligarchic backer, Elon Musk, will do everything he can to keep Tesla’s Chinese competitors out of the US electric-vehicle market. That will keep prices high and slow the transition to EVs – a transition that is essential to curb carbon emissions and limit global warming.
At the same time that he squanders US leadership on this key national-security and global challenge, he will likely give Russian President Vladimir Putin whatever he wants in Ukraine, and he will greenlight Binyamin Netanyahu’s plans to pursue armed conflict with Iran and kill off the prospect of a two-state solution. As he walks away from, or sharply limits America’s role in, NATO, Europeans will be on their own.
Laura Tyson, a former chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton administration, is a professor at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and a member of the Board of Advisers at Angeleno Group.
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Although Americans – and the world – have been spared the kind of agonizing uncertainty that followed the 2020 election, a different kind of uncertainty has set in. While few doubt that Donald Trump's comeback will have far-reaching implications, most observers are only beginning to come to grips with what those could be.
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From the economy to foreign policy to democratic institutions, the two US presidential candidates, Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, promise to pursue radically different agendas, reflecting sharply diverging visions for the United States and the world. Why is the race so nail-bitingly close, and how might the outcome change America?
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After the 2020 US election, it took days for major news networks to project the winner of the presidential race, and many more weeks for Americans – and the world – to know if there would be a peaceful and orderly transition of power. There wasn’t. The incumbent, Donald Trump, conspired to overturn the results, and then encouraged a mob of his followers to storm the US Capitol.
In 2024, Americans – and the world – have been spared that agonizing uncertainty, but will now confront instability in a more virulent form, because voters in the United States have handed Trump (now a convicted felon) and his party a decisive victory. How did it happen, and what does the outcome portend? Below, Project Syndicate commentators consider what another Trump presidency will mean for the US and global economies, domestic policy, and the future of democracy.
RUTH BEN-GHIAT
With Donald Trump’s desire to be a dictator so central to his persona and his political platform, the 2024 election was a referendum on whether Americans want to continue to live in a democracy, or prefer some form of “strongman” rule. They chose the latter.
Of course, many who voted for Trump would say that they based their decision on his promise to bring down the price of eggs; because there are too many illegal immigrants in America; or because cities are overrun with crime and homeless people. But make no mistake: Trump’s campaign was a rehearsal for autocracy, featuring praise for foreign dictators as models of leadership, warnings about the “enemy within” (meaning his political opponents), and a depiction of America as a failed democratic experiment – the “garbage can of the world.”
Authoritarians often tell you what they are going to do – both as a means of intimidating those who would resist and to condition the broader public for what is coming. Based on what Trump has said, we should prepare for a declaration of a state of emergency on or around “Day One” (the codeword used by Trump’s MAGA movement and its policy blueprint, Project 2025, for an authoritarian takeover). The trumped-up justification could be (non-existent) threats from the “radical Marxist left,” (non-existent) “immigrant invasions,” or some (non-existent) conspiracy hatched by the Democratic “enemy within” and foreign “globalist warmongers.”
Under this state of exception, Trump’s bureaucratic “army” (Project 2025’s label for its cadre of politicized civil servants) can then be deployed to “dismantle the administrative state,” thus completing the destruction of America’s liberal democratic institutions of governance. Over time, there would be steady suppression of reproductive and voting rights; a constant threat of political violence; unrestrained oligarchic plunder of public resources; soaring economic inequality; investigations of critics that end with imprisonment (or perhaps execution by firing squad – a recurrent Trump fantasy); and perhaps deployment of the military against protesters and to carry out mass deportations.
These abuses are familiar from the history of authoritarianism. Now, America will experience them first-hand.
Ruth Ben-Ghiat, Professor of History and Italian Studies at New York University, is the author of Strongmen: Mussolini to the Present (W.W. Norton & Company, 2020).
JEFFREY FRANKEL
The two domains that worry me the most are misguided US foreign policy and long-run damage to norms of truth, democracy, and respect for the rule of law. But these areas are not top priorities for much of the American public. Rather, voters have consistently reported to be most concerned with the economy. They asked, “Are we better off than we were four years ago” and answered with a firm “no.” This is itself remarkable, since in November 2020 COVID-19 deaths were running at 10,000 per week, and unemployment was 6.7%, versus 4.1% today.
One hears various explanations for the public’s perception of poor economic performance. Perhaps the most common is the observation that inflation under Joe Biden has been higher than it was during Donald Trump’s first term. But most of the economic policies that Trump has campaigned on can be expected to put upward pressure on prices, assuming he follows through on them. These policies include challenges to the Federal Reserve’s independence and pressure for lower interest rates; depreciation of the dollar, to counter supposed undervaluation of trading partners’ currencies; large tax cuts that are not paid for, with the result that they widen the budget deficit; sharp increases in tariff rates, to 60% on all imports from China and up to 20% on all other imports; and mass deportation of undocumented immigrants and restrictions on legal immigration.
If this prediction of higher inflation during the coming four years is borne out, will US voters take note? Will Trump supporters forget in 2028 how they voted in 2024?
Jeffrey Frankel, Professor of Capital Formation and Growth at Harvard University, served as a member of President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers. He is a research associate at the US National Bureau of Economic Research.
JAMES K. GALBRAITH
I went to bed early election night, unsurprised by the outcome. Among the reasons: prices, interest rates, wars, genocide, a case of dementia, and an empty campaign whose main theme was “Oh no! Not the other guy!”
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Donald Trump may be old, angry, and erratic, but he is not empty. Kamala Harris projected the void. Her presidency would have been in the hands of advisers – people like Paul Krugman or Liz Cheney. If Harris had charted a course of her own, she might have won; but if she had been capable of that, Joe Biden would not have picked her for vice president four years ago.
On the “glorious” economy, Krugman stated the Democratic ticket’s case: Growth is “a remarkable success,” inflation “looks beaten,” and “claims that we have a bad economy are about as credible as claims that armed migrants have taken over Times Square.” There was just one problem: checking their kitchens and their bank accounts, it appears that millions of voters disagreed.
Over at the Institute for New Economic Thinking, Thomas Ferguson makes a strong argument: Until the pandemic, the Trump years brought income gains for American workers, and COVID-19 relief reinforced those gains; but then price increases took them away. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve fed a “wealth-effect” boom in consumption by the rich, and then high interest rates froze the housing market for everyone else.
The great mystery of this election, as of now, is that Trump’s overall vote barely changed from 2020 to 2024, while the drop-off from Biden to Harris was around 13 million votes (from 81 to 68 million). That’s a huge – and very unbalanced – change. What happened? We don’t know, but the question should be posed and answered.
James K. Galbraith, Professor of Government and Chair in Government/Business Relations at the University of Texas at Austin, is co-author (with Jing Chen) of the forthcoming Entropy Economics: The Living Basis of Value and Production (University of Chicago Press, 2025).
AZIZ HUQ
Americans voted for their pocketbooks and not with their conscience. Among the values set aside in the 2024 presidential election were humanity, decency, democracy, and the rule of law.
It may seem paradoxical, or even contradictory, to say that “democracy” lost in a vote that yielded, if nothing else, a clear snapshot of popular sentiment and a corresponding presidential choice. But there is nothing odd, or incoherent, about saying that a democratic choice can undermine democracy – the twentieth century saw a lot of that. It is entirely possible for a polity to choose a candidate or party that has demonstrated, and then loudly reiterated, its refusal to abide by the established rules of democratic competition, and its determination to use the awesome power of the government to overwhelm or handicap its opponents.
The now thoroughly Trumpian Republican Party has shown no hesitation in using rhetoric and violence that scorns the idea of mutual tolerance and forbearance. Expect that political movement to entrench itself in, and transform, the federal government into a tool not just for its policies but more generally for its enduring hegemony. Expect the rule of law to be bent increasingly into an instrument for turning whim into command, without any prospect that power will be bridled in ways that make it predictable rather than arbitrary.
There will be talk in the coming weeks or months about whether America’s democratic institutions are likely to prove resilient. It is important to observe that these institutions have already failed an important test: There are a range of legal mechanisms that are meant to prevent an incumbent president from violating the public’s trust, and existing laws, to stay in power. Impeachment, disqualification for “insurrection” or “rebellion,” and criminal prosecution – all failed. They failed as a means to bolt in the rule of law. And they failed as signals of unfitness for office.
On the back of that failure, the public has now repudiated those votes against Donald Trump by using their own votes to re-elect him. What remains may be resilient, but whether it is enough to count as “democracy” remains to be seen.
Aziz Huq, Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, is the author of The Collapse of Constitutional Remedies (Oxford University Press, 2021).
HAROLD JAMES
Donald Trump and the Republicans have decisively won a free and fair election. Democracy is very good at picking up on voters’ most passionate concerns. Americans were worried about inflation and immigration, and though democracy was also a big issue, the manner in which Vice President Kamala Harris was installed as the Democratic Party’s nominee following President Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the race did raise eyebrows. The Democrats will undoubtedly engage in a painful postmortem of the failure to insist on a more democratic nominating process at their Chicago convention.
Unfortunately, though democracy is good at highlighting anxieties, it is not necessarily good at producing the best remedies. Americans are worried about price increases, but Trump’s proposed tariffs would make many goods even more expensive. Appliances, electronics, and clothing will all cost more, and American farmers – a key constituency in some states – will be hit hard when other countries retaliate. Everyone, including America, will suffer from a trade war.
Trade has been a central concern for Trump since the 1980s, when he was passionate about a supposed Japanese threat to take over the world. But this was always a blinkered view of the economic transformation that occurred in the late twentieth century, and Trump’s zero-sum mentality will do nothing to help Americans today. Similarly, his threat to expel undocumented immigrants – many of them employed in jobs Americans won’t do – is unlikely to reduce price pressures or create more jobs for US citizens.
The new administration will inevitably blame the US Federal Reserve, rather than its own policies, for any renewed monetary turbulence. Meanwhile, the fiscal legacy of the global financial crisis, Trump’s first term, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Biden’s own spending policies will remain. Without a clear, coherent fiscal plan, a rising share of the budget will go toward debt service unless the administration succeeds in bullying the Fed to hold down interest rates. But if that happens, we can expect far higher inflation, and we can say goodbye to the dollar’s dominant position in the world financial system.
Harold James, Professor of History and International Affairs at Princeton University, is the author, most recently, of Seven Crashes: The Economic Crises That Shaped Globalization (Yale University Press, 2023).
CHARLES A. KUPCHAN
Donald Trump’s decisive victory answers, at least for now, a central question that was looming over the election: Will the political center hold? The answer, clearly, is no – and not just in the United States. Trump’s win does not auger well for the political center globally, including in Europe, where the ideological extremes continue to gain ground. Many of the world’s democracies appear headed for a prolonged period of polarization and illiberal populism, with the US leading the way.
Trump’s return to power should therefore serve as a wake-up call, prompting urgent efforts to tackle the factors that have hollowed out political centrism and fueled the growth of a strident populism. Those steps must address two key challenges.
First, in the aftermath of the erosion of the social contract of the industrial era, the US needs to rebuild its middle class. Trump has promised to do so, turning to protective tariffs aimed at turning the US back into a “manufacturing powerhouse.” But protectionist barriers would not only risk blowing up the global economy; they would also fail to solve the problem.
In an era of digitization and automation, the scale of any conceivable manufacturing turnaround will not come close to what would be required to return a broad swath of working Americans to the middle class. Instead, the US government needs to work with the private sector to fashion an education and employment ecosystem that will enable working Americans to earn a living wage as automation, artificial intelligence, and other technologies evolve. Much of this effort needs to focus on creating and filling well-paid jobs in the service sector, where most Americans will work – and where roughly 80% of the US workforce is already employed. The same goes for other advanced economies.
Second, Trump needs to work with Congress to overhaul the nation’s broken immigration system. The influx of migrants across the southern border has been a major source of both polarization and electoral discontent. It is past time to enact legislation that secures the border, establishes an orderly and streamlined system for processing legal immigration, and charts a humane pathway for resolving the status of millions of undocumented migrants. Many other democracies, particularly in Europe, similarly need to tackle immigration reform.
As for the global impact of his return to power, Trump promises to be far more unilateralist than isolationist. The world should be ready for a fiercely transactional foreign policy; foreign leaders should understand that they will be dealing with a real-estate mogul, not a statesman. Allies will need to spend more on their own defense to stay in Trump’s good graces. Ukraine had better get ready to seek a diplomatic endgame to its fight against Russian aggression. Israel may have a freer hand as it seeks to take down the “axis of resistance,” but it had better ready a postwar peace plan that will be to Trump’s liking. Allies and adversaries alike should get ready for a raft of new US tariffs, but they may be able to negotiate trade deals that strike Trump’s fancy, thereby helping prevent the fragmentation of the global economy.
Trump won a commanding victory. We may lament that outcome, but we need to try to make the most of it.
Charles A. Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, served on the National Security Council under Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama.
CARLA NORRLÖF
The economy was a major issue in this election, but it operated within a broader context in which perceived leadership qualities and demographic factors contributed to Donald Trump’s success. Exit polls indicate that 52% of voters trust Trump more to handle the economy, a perspective likely bolstered by positive income growth across all income groups during his previous tenure. Moreover, Trump was overwhelmingly favored among the 30% of voters who value a candidate with the “ability to lead,” and among the 28% who want someone who “can bring needed change.”
Many Americans vote their wallets. The bottom income quintile (those earning less than $30,000 per year) has experienced higher income growth under Joe Biden, and favored Kamala Harris. Voters in the second and third quintiles ($30,000-$99,999) experienced higher income growth during Trump’s previous administration, and favored Trump this time. Inflation likely eroded the purchasing power of their gains, leading to economic dissatisfaction. Among voters who felt that their family’s financial situation is worse now than four years ago, 81% supported Trump, suggesting that subjective perceptions of economic hardship may have outweighed actual income statistics.
Harris also faced unique challenges that may have affected voters’ perception of her. The scrutiny she encountered overshadowed her substantive contributions and messaging on issues like immigration, health care, and equity. Media narratives often underreported her achievements, while focusing on controversies or perceived shortcomings. As in 2016, Trump relied on simple, catchy language and anecdotes to tap into voters’ anxieties about the economy and immigration. He was well positioned to promise a return to the income growth that was achieved during his first term, and to respond forcefully to what are generally agreed to be significant challenges on the southern border.
Trump also ruthlessly attacked Harris’s credibility and relied on racist and sexist stereotypes – going so far as to call her “stupid” and “low IQ.” And yet he has faced numerous indictments and allegations related to sexual misconduct, tax fraud, obstruction of justice, election interference, and incitement of the January 6, 2021, insurrection. It is a testament to his extraordinary ability to evade any consequences that voters nonetheless perceive him as a credible leader.
Carla Norrlöf, Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
CECILIA ELENA ROUSE
Based on his campaign, Donald Trump’s economic agenda will center on extending some or all of the expiring 2017 tax cuts, reducing other individual and business taxes, strengthening national defense, and addressing immigration. If you add in other campaign proposals (including some that would raise revenue), the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimates that Trump’s agenda would add $7.75 trillion to the United States’ projected national debt through 2035. This would be on top of the $26 trillion of debt already held by the public, which the Congressional Budget Office estimates will increase to more than $50 trillion by 2034 even without Trump’s proposals.
The US federal government does not have an official “budget constraint,” but such a large federal debt burden will certainly fuel pressure to cut spending. The question is what and where to cut. In 2023, discretionary spending – such as outlays for defense, transportation, veterans’ benefits, and education – comprised only about one-quarter of the budget. This is spending that must be appropriated each year and is negotiated as part of the budget process. Most of the spending is on entitlement programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security (as well as a few others), which are mandated by law. Without completely gutting discretionary spending, there is not enough room to enact Trump’s desired agenda and have an appropriately sized federal budget.
And how to make space for new priorities? Unless policymakers are willing to reform entitlement programs and find additional sources of revenue, there will be very little fiscal space for policies needed to boost economic productivity – such as by investing in new infrastructure or finding ways to support an aging workforce. Furthermore, increasing the US federal debt promises to be inflationary, which will exacerbate many Americans’ economic woes. Trump will face many challenges during his second term, and policymakers can address them only if they have some fiscal breathing room to launch reforms.
Cecilia Elena Rouse, former chair of US President Joe Biden’s Council of Economic Advisers, is President of the Brookings Institution.
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER
In 2008, Barack Obama won the presidency on a platform of hope and change, running on a political manifesto entitled The Audacity of Hope and a theme song called “Yes We Can.” Kamala Harris tried the same strategy this year, looking forward and trying to turn the page on an era of division and growing hate. This time fear triumphed over hope.
The majority of Americans are just too angry. Men are angry that they are being pushed aside, losing their traditional roles of breadwinner, protector, and leader. Young people are angry that they cannot afford the middle-class lifestyle – a house, children, cars, and vacations – that their parents had. Rural Americans are deeply angry at the elites on the coasts and in the big cities, the people in power who dismiss them as uneducated and provincial.
Americans across the country are angry at prices – for groceries, transportation, medication, childcare, and other necessities – that have often reached absurd levels and make it impossible to live the way they once did. Uber and Lyft introduced themselves a decade ago as alternatives to expensive taxis; today even short rides cost between $30 and $50 in many cities. Americans who are experiencing rapid demographic change are angry at the immigrants whom they perceive to be taking over and remaking the country.
Women are angry too, at losing control of their own bodies. But their anger was not enough to turn the tide.
Anger often reflects fear, and there is plenty to be afraid of in a deeply uncertain and violent world. It also reflects the persistent sense that America itself – its infrastructure, health system, borders, and the political system – is broken. Notwithstanding Joe Biden’s many successes, Donald Trump’s dark visions captured the national mood. He won as an angry battering ram of change, aimed at the system itself.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former director of policy planning in the US State Department, is CEO of the think tank New America, Professor Emerita of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and the author of Renewal: From Crisis to Transformation in Our Lives, Work, and Politics(Princeton University Press, 2021).
LAURA TYSON
On most macroeconomic indicators – GDP growth, unemployment, (declining) inflation, business investment, the stock market, and real (inflation-adjusted) wage growth – the US economy is the envy of the world. Yet millions of voters in red (Republican-leaning) and blue (Democratic) states and across demographic groups voted for Donald Trump, because they are deeply angry that the economy has not delivered for them. They want a change in direction – an economy that delivers gains for everyone.
But, under Trump, they will not get what they want. They will get tax cuts that disproportionately benefit the rich, paid for by eviscerating cuts to the Affordable Care Act, Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and other key middle-class programs. They will get larger federal budget deficits, and thus higher interest rates. They will get big across-the-board increases in tariffs that drive up prices, particularly for low- and middle-income consumers. The overall US economy will be dragged down by a stronger dollar, retaliatory tariffs imposed by trading partners, and the business uncertainty resulting from Trump’s plans to upend the rules and change or terminate programs across all major government agencies. Trump’s economic agenda is a recipe for stagflation and growing wage and income inequality.
Moreover, the Republicans’ plan to curtail reproductive rights for women will have negative economic consequences for women and their families. Despite historic storms and fires, Trump will walk away from the Inflation Reduction Act’s effective, business-friendly incentives to advance the clean-energy transition (even though red states have benefited disproportionately from these policies). In economic relations with China, Trump might adopt a “transactional art-of-the-deal” approach, negotiating bilateral agreements that reduce the US trade deficit. His oligarchic backer, Elon Musk, will do everything he can to keep Tesla’s Chinese competitors out of the US electric-vehicle market. That will keep prices high and slow the transition to EVs – a transition that is essential to curb carbon emissions and limit global warming.
At the same time that he squanders US leadership on this key national-security and global challenge, he will likely give Russian President Vladimir Putin whatever he wants in Ukraine, and he will greenlight Binyamin Netanyahu’s plans to pursue armed conflict with Iran and kill off the prospect of a two-state solution. As he walks away from, or sharply limits America’s role in, NATO, Europeans will be on their own.
Laura Tyson, a former chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton administration, is a professor at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and a member of the Board of Advisers at Angeleno Group.