Shlomo Ben-Ami
Negotiators have been working on a deal for a six-week pause in the fighting, during which Hamas would release all remaining Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners. If they succeed, it will have a major impact on the war’s trajectory.
The implicit core of the negotiations is the question of whether the war should end now, as Hamas advocates, or continue until Israel achieves its stated goals – in particular, the “obliteration” of Hamas. While the deal includes only a ceasefire – Israel has not been asked to agree to any lasting peace – it is assumed that a long ceasefire would make it difficult to resume fighting.
A pause in the war will automatically apply to the northern front, where Israel has been exchanging fire with Hezbollah. This would enable some of the Israeli residents who have been evacuated from the border area to return to their homes, and allow US special envoy Amos Hochstein to resume his efforts to resolve the border dispute between Israel and Lebanon. Should negotiations fail, the possibility of a preemptive Israeli war against Hezbollah cannot be ruled out.
A six-week ceasefire would also give the United States an opportunity to work on a political agreement, in which a revitalized Palestinian Authority (PA) takes over administration of the Gaza Strip, and a multinational Arab force is deployed to secure the area. A vaguely defined two-state-solution endgame would also be included, in order to offer Saudi Arabia cover to resume diplomatic normalization with Israel. This would help advance US President Joe Biden’s broader strategic objective of establishing a pro-Western regional alliance – including moderate Arab regimes and Israel – to counter the “axis of resistance,” comprising China, Iran (and its proxies), and Russia.
But a lot could go wrong. Netanyahu’s political survival depends on the war continuing: any political deal would dissolve his coalition of extremists. If real progress is to be made in ending the war and securing the region, both Israelis and Palestinians will have to put their political houses in order.
If Israel does decide to keep the war going until it can claim victory, it will end up in a situation much like that faced by the US after its “victory” in Iraq. Hamas’s military and political leadership will be eliminated, and its chain of command will be broken, so that the organization ceases to function as a hierarchical system. Thousands of Hamas fighters will then rejoin Palestinian society, and in the post-conflict chaos, some will form criminal gangs, while others will join radical Salafist groups. The era of glorious victories is over.
Charles A. Kupchan
Over the course of the next few months, either of two radically different scenarios could play out in the Gaza conflict. The first entails continued warfare, no movement toward a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians, and a Middle East that becomes more unstable and increasingly vulnerable to Iranian radicalism. The other scenario features a temporary ceasefire, a new Israeli strategy that combines surgical strikes against Hamas with a plan for building a new, more competent Palestinian leadership capable of self-rule, and the isolation and weakening of Iran, as Israel gradually normalizes relations with its Arab neighbors.
In the first, darker scenario, it is possible that Israel agrees to a temporary ceasefire, in exchange for the release of the remaining hostages. But it eventually resumes its high-intensity campaign aimed at the complete destruction of Hamas, and thousands more Palestinians lose their lives. The violence eventually subsides, but there is no clear inflection point marking the end of the war and the beginning of the “day after.” As has occurred in the wake of previous bouts of violence, Israeli public opinion shifts further to the right, with talk of Palestinian autonomy dismissed as a recipe for more attacks against Israel. Violence continues in the West Bank, and fighting between Hezbollah and Israeli forces in the north drags on. The prospect of diplomatic normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia dwindles, and Israel’s relationship with the international community, including the US, grows increasingly strained. The biggest winner is Iran, which makes new inroads across the Middle East.
The second scenario is much brighter. Negotiations produce a lengthy ceasefire that brings home the Israeli hostages. When Israel returns to the battlefield, it employs only surgical operations and commando raids against remaining Hamas leadership and arms depots. Meanwhile, Israel works with the US, Europe, Turkey, and a coalition of Arab neighbors to reform the PA in the West Bank, extend the PA’s authority into Gaza, and advance reconstruction and improve governance in Gaza. Hezbollah pulls back from the Israeli border, enabling evacuees to return to their homes in the north. Israelis recognize that there are no viable alternatives to allowing Palestinians to govern themselves, even if Israel retains ultimate control over security from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean Sea. Israel and the PA devise a roadmap to a two-state solution, enabling normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel to get back on track. The main loser is Iran, whose leverage dissipates as the Middle East moves toward a new normal of regional integration and stability.
Given the far-right tilt of Israel’s current government and the staying power of the “axis of resistance” supported and masterminded by Iran, the darker scenario is regrettably the one that is more likely to play out. Avoiding that outcome will require a determined push from the US and its partners. They must work to ensure that the current conflict ends up being a catalyst for change – not just another turn in the cycle of violence – convincing Israelis and Palestinians alike that enough is enough.
Mark Leonard
Nearly four months after Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, the war in Gaza has already spread to ten countries, and it shows no signs of winding down. On the contrary, every day that the fighting continues, the risk of escalation grows. Unfortunately, domestic politics in Israel, the US, the Palestinian territories, and the Arab world make it difficult to believe that the tragedy of October 7 will catalyze a concerted effort to achieve a lasting regional settlement, as some have proposed. On the contrary, if the war is allowed to continue for another three months, the risks of a massive cross-regional conflict will grow.
There is no shortage of powder kegs. Israel could invade southern Lebanon. American soldiers could get killed in strikes by pro-Iranian militants in Syria or Iraq. Widespread unrest could erupt in the West Bank. Any one of these scenarios has the potential to tip the world into massive disorder.
That is why, despite the challenges involved, the West should push for an immediate ceasefire, political change in Israel, and a revitalized PA. If these three things can be accomplished, it may still be possible to use the prospect of regional normalization as a lever for a wider settlement leading to a two-state solution. It is hard to be optimistic, but if pessimism translates into passivity and resignation, governments could end up paying a much higher price.