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Marietje Schaake
Says More…
This week in Say More, PS talks with Marietje Schaake, a former member of the European Parliament, International Policy Director of the Cyber Policy Center at Stanford University, International Policy Fellow at Stanford’s Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI), and a member of the Executive Committee of the UN High-level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence.
Project Syndicate: Powerful new technologies, such as generative artificial intelligence, could “undermine democratic governance,” you warned earlier this year. In your book, The Tech Coup: How to Save Democracy from Silicon Valley, you argue that tech companies are compounding this risk by increasingly taking on functions “normally assumed by states.” Why is this outsourcing to the private sector more worrisome than in the past, and how should legal frameworks be rethought in response to the new dangers?
Marietje Schaake: There is an “ecosystem” of companies, large and small, that wield enormous power because they produce or control technologies that affect people’s rights or the role of the state. The amount of data, computational power, capital, and talent that they have amassed, and the variety of critical roles they play in our world, is unprecedented. Add to that products that are often non-transparent, highly personalized, ever-changing, and unpredictable – as is the case with artificial intelligence – and regulating these firms can be extremely difficult.
The resulting “tech coup” poses a threat to democracy, as it leaves the public unable to exercise real agency or hold companies accountable. Given the stakes, powerful countervailing measures are in order.
PS: You write that to “steer technological innovation” in a way that reflects and reinforces democratic principles, governments must “deepen their understanding of how these technologies function, as well as the interplay between them.” What steps are needed to ensure that decision-makers not only have access to the necessary expertise, but also “educate themselves on what exactly is happening at the cutting edge”?
MS: Since technology touches almost all aspects of our lives – from health care and agriculture to national security and even our fundamental rights as citizens – all decision-makers will have to deal with it in one way or another. But it is lobbyists, not independent experts, who typically frame the debate about technology and, thus, technology policy.
One solution would be to give lawmakers, such as members of the US Congress, access to a set of independent technology experts who can offer necessary explanations and insights. This is hardly a radical idea: lawmakers can already request feedback on legislative proposals from an independent and impartial legal service. Meanwhile, giving academics more access to data and computational power would help to advance research that would support a more fact-based political debate about the role of technology in our societies.
PS: Imports from foreign companies – particularly those in authoritarian states like China – also carry risks for democratic countries. As you noted in March, “China’s intelligence laws” provide “ample reason for concern” that personal data, such as collected by TikTok, “can end up being used by the state.” Do you similarly see merit in the recent proposal to ban Chinese-developed software from being used in internet-connected cars in the United States? How should US policymakers approach such a ban?
MS: The first step is to carry out comprehensive, country-agnostic assessments to determine when data collection and access, or the use of certain software, becomes undesirable. That said, as I note in The Tech Coup, all smart devices are vulnerable to hacking. And the US itself lacks a federal data-protection law, raising concerns that the information tech companies collect can fall into the wrong hands. So, what is really needed are not narrow policies targeting specific technologies or countries of origin, but rather a comprehensive vision that accounts for the risks, whether to individual privacy or national security, raised by digitization.
BY THE WAY…
PS: You suggest in The Tech Coup that, while China’s “sweeping surveillance state” is hardly a model for democratic countries to emulate, it does reflect a “cohesive, top-down” approach to technology governance that harnesses tech companies’ capabilities to advance state goals. What, if anything, can China teach democratic countries about technology governance?
MS: The main lesson democratic countries should draw from Chinese technology governance is that the state can make a huge difference, if it chooses to assert itself. The idea that the state cannot or should not govern the digital realm more comprehensively is absurd. The extent to which democratic politicians of all political stripes have abdicated their responsibility to do so is mind-boggling.
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PS: You point out that regulation is not the only way democratic governments can influence tech firms. Public procurement is another. How should governments use this power? Which reforms or outcomes should they aim for first?
MS: The standards set in government contracts shape markets. For example, when the US government took the bold decision to stop using commercial spyware, it effectively drew a moral line: the US will not contribute to fostering such anti-democratic innovation. This inevitably affects the standards for the spyware industry and those who might use their services.
Given this influence, government should act as a more conscious consumer of technology, incorporating more public-interest provisions, transparency, and accountability into its contracts. Ideally, it would go so far as to implement a “three strikes” policy, with software and cybersecurity companies losing access to government contracts after a few instances of, say, negligence or discrimination. Companies must no longer be allowed to overpromise and underdeliver with impunity, not least because the costs of the damage their technologies cause are often borne by the public.
PS: While far from perfect, the European Union is undoubtedly a global leader in technology governance, thanks partly to your efforts during your years in the European Parliament. Which initiative(s) are you most proud to have helped push through? When it comes to strengthening governance further, do you see any low-hanging fruit?
MS: While the EU has led the way in technology governance, there is a need to improve enforcement of the laws it has passed and pursue more ambitious investments. Moreover, the EU must address the legal and regulatory fragmentation – with different member states pursuing different policies – that is undermining its ability to meet its tech-governance potential.
I am most proud of my work on strengthening the human-rights protections. Ultimately, my thinking on technology is always guided by a simple question: What are the worst potential outcomes for the most vulnerable people? By contrast, in Silicon Valley, the focus is often on the opportunities technology creates for the wealthiest and most empowered.
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