en English

The Future of the Establishment

Podcasts Oct 22, 2019 Matthew Goodwin and Elmira Bayrasli

As the United States and the United Kingdom gear up for elections in the next year, many are asking if populist nationalism is here to stay, or whether establishment parties can regain control.

Matthew Goodwin, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent, joined us in early October in our studios in New York to discuss.

Listen and subscribe to all episodes from your favorite podcast app. Find Opinion Has It on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Acast, or via RSS Feed. Have a suggestion for an episode? Email us at podcasts@project-syndicate.org.

Subscribe to PS Digital

Access every new PS commentary, our entire On Point suite of subscriber-exclusive content – including Longer Reads, Insider Interviews, Big Picture/Big Question, and Say More – and the full PS archive.

Subscribe Now

Featured

How to Govern the Bretton Woods Institutions Better

How to Govern the Bretton Woods Institutions Better

Apr 11, 2024 Brahima Coulibaly, et al.
The World Is Still on Fire

The World Is Still on Fire

Apr 15, 2024 Lawrence H. Summers & N.K. Singh
How to Think About AI Policy

How to Think About AI Policy

Mar 11, 2024 Margrethe Vestager
The Threat Posed by Cambodia’s New Strongman

The Threat Posed by Cambodia’s New Strongman

Apr 10, 2024 Mu Sochua
Beating Back Populists at the Grassroots

Beating Back Populists at the Grassroots

Apr 11, 2024 Sławomir Sierakowski

Matthew Goodwin

Matthew Goodwin is Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent, and an associate fellow at Chatham House. He is the co-author of National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy.

Elmira Bayrasli

Writing for PS since 2016
3 Commentaries

Elmira Bayrasli is the co-founder and CEO of Foreign Policy Interrupted and the author of From The Other Side of The World: Extraordinary Entrepreneurs, Unlikely Places.

new comment has been posted. new comments have been posted.

0 Comments on this paragraph, 4 Comments on this article

j. von Hettlingen Oct 24, 2019

In her interview with Matthew Goodwin, Elmira Bayrasli wants to know whether national populism has become a constant feature in Western politics, or whether establishment parties can ever regain their lost influence. Both the UK and the US have been engulfed by far-right populist tides since Britain voted to leave the EU in June 2016 and the election of Trump in November that same year. And both countries are gearing up for elections in the coming months.
In his book “National Populism” with co-writer Roger Eatwell, Goodwin describes how different segments of the Western society revolt against liberal democracy, explaining why populist parties have been able to make inroads into national parliaments and the executive. While distrust of mainstream political parties of the left and right is on the rise, voters also reject the political establishment, which they see as aloof and callous.
The two authors claim that rightwing populism has been brewing under the surface for centuries. They lay out their evidence in “four Ds” : “distrust”, which highlights the very low levels of public trust in the classical establishment; the “destruction” of national identity by accelerating patterns of globalisation and movement between cultures; “deprivation” brought about by rising inequality and the effects of “neoliberal” economics; and “de-alignment” in political identification and voting behaviour.
While the rise in populist public sentiment and politics is real, in the case of Brexit, the decision to leave the EU is breaking down the left-right divide. There are Brexiteers among Labour as well as conservative Tory voters. Supporters of left-wing populism feel left behind by a globalised economy that thrives on free trade, but economic circumstances are not the key variable that help explain the emergence of an international wave of populist politics that prioritises national identity and sovereignty over cosmopolitanism.
It is also noteworthy to point out that in many cases the levels of education rather than age that determines whether someone votes for Trump or Brexit. Older, white, educated voters helped Trump win in 2016. Now, they are trending toward Democrats in such numbers that their ballots could tip the scales.
If there were a second referendum on Britain’s EU membership, some young, uneducated Britons in rural areas who voted to leave in 2016, would not change their minds about leaving. However college-educated young Britons are clamouring for a second vote, hoping to reverse Brexit, because they have through travels and academic exchanges learned to appreciate the freedom of movement within the EU.
Populists belong to a highly diverse bunch. Not all of them are conservative, some support Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) issues, while they reject migrants and Muslims etc.
What is not universally true is the authors’ assumption that people become more conservative with age. Once again education and open-mindedness may be the determinants. It is not a person’s age that is important, but rather which generation they belong to. Older generations of voters, who were brought up in different circumstances to younger voters, could vote differently as a result.
Many have argued that younger generations are more socially liberal. This is partially because young people are more likely to have been to university (about 35% of 30-year-olds have a degree, compared with 10% of 70-year-olds) and higher education tends to make people more open-minded. There is still hope that establishment parties that embrace liberal centrist values may still make a comeback in the coming elections, if they pay more attention to what is relevant to voters.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.
Petey Bee Oct 23, 2019

A good discussion.

Near the beginning, one question was whether to analyze nationalist populism in terms of social-conservative vs economic motivations.

The trouble is they are quite easy to combine. Anti migrant sentiment is seen by nationalists as a pocketbook issue - i.e. why should a "native" be forced to compete with a newcomer accustomed to substandard terms of labor?

Centrist-liberals unwittingly produced exactly this framing. I.e. by abandoning postwar social democratic compromises in practice, and dismissing discussion of policy in terms of capital-vs-labor in rhetoric. The entire labor issue was gifted to nationalists to shape per their worldview.

While this lesson has been sortof learned, here and there, at the intellectual level, it has yet to penetrate into centrist-liberal party politics. The current effort within nominally center-left parties is still to *actively resist* any return to the left on economic issues.

---

My other comment is on the "process" based reaction to electoral setbacks by centrist-liberals. In the US, the it consists of more than just turning to the judicial and legislative branches of government, to counter the Trump Administration.

The center of the Dem response is actually the US national security apparatus and intelligence agencies. We are trying quite hard to give these bodies the authority of a fourth branch of government.

Terrible idea. *Especially* if analyzing the problem of nationalist populism as fundamentally a reactionary social-conservative movement. The security agencies are staffed by individuals with lifelong belief in nationalist ideology - a requirement of the job. They will stick to it for good, while being flexible on economic issues. They will give up Trump but will hold on to everything he stands for in regards to migrants.

They will also be quite happy to carve out a permanent veto role in our democratic system, and make alliances with the center-right and far right in the future. They will also be empowered by the aid of economic elites looking to circle the wagons due to neoliberal theory being discredited. This all is the central danger of the current moment.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.
Jim Parker Oct 23, 2019

I fundamentally disagree with the thesis that the primary driver of the surge in populism is cultural insecurity. If that were the case, why did we not see this BEFORE the global financial crisis? Goode claims that cultural insecurity is in the driver’s seat with economic insecurity in the passenger’s seat. It is the other way around. He is also incorrect in the view that this populist movement has sprung naturally from the electorate. Look at the Tea Party and other Astro-turfed movements. The truth is that the neoliberal establishment, having seen its grand project full apart in 2008, has held onto power by actively and cynically fostering division, spreading disinformation via social media and encouraging racial animosity so that working class people vote against their own economic interests. This has been a calculated rearguard action by a powerful capitalist class to hold onto its privileges by shifting the locus of resentment from the plutocrats and carpetbaggers to the most marginal people in our communities. Now the people will pay twice over.
A new reply to this comment has been posted.

https://prosyn.org/HcqYuVm

The Future of the Establishment

Subscribe to PS Digital

Featured

How to Govern the Bretton Woods Institutions Better

The World Is Still on Fire

How to Think About AI Policy

The Threat Posed by Cambodia’s New Strongman

Beating Back Populists at the Grassroots

New Comment

Email this piece to a friend

Contact us

Log in/Register

The Future of the Establishment

Subscribe to PS Digital

Featured

Edit Newsletter Preferences

Set up Notification