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Politics

كيفية كبح الفساد في أوكرانيا

Oct 14, 2019 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson

كمبريدج ـ بعد لحظة انهيار الاتحاد السوفيتي مباشرة، كان قلة من الناس يعتقدون أن دولة أوكرانيا ـ باعتبارها دولة صناعية تتمتع بقوة عاملة مُكونة وموارد طبيعية هائلة ـ ستعاني من الركود على مدار الـ 28 عامًا القادمة. لم تكن دولة بولندا المجاورة غنية مثل أوكرانيا في عام 1991، ولكنها نجحت في مضاعفة نصيب الفرد من الناتج المحلي الإجمالي إلى ثلاثة أضعاف (من حيث تعادل القوة الشرائية) خلال العقود الثلاثة المقبلة.

معظم الأوكرانيين يعرفون السبب وراء هذا الركود: تُعد بلادهم من بين أكثر الدول فسادًا في العالم. لم يكن انتشار الفساد أمرا مُفاجئا، وبالتالي فإن السؤال الحقيقي هو ما السبب الرئيسي وراء الفساد المُستشري في البلاد.

كما هو الحال في الجمهوريات السوفيتية الأخرى، تركزت القوة الأوكرانية منذ فترة طويلة في أيدي النخبة الشيوعية التي عينها الكرملين. كان الحزب الشيوعي الأوكراني إلى حد كبير جهازًا مزروعًا للحزب الشيوعي الروسي نفسه وكان يتصرف بشكل منتظم على حساب مصالح الأوكرانيين الأصليين.

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Daron Acemoglu

Writing for PS since 2012
62 Commentaries

Daron Acemoglu, Professor of Economics at MIT, is a co-author (with James A. Robinson) of Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (Profile, 2019) and a co-author (with Simon Johnson) of Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs, May 2023).

James A. Robinson

Writing for PS since 2012
8 Commentaries

James A. Robinson, Institute Director of the Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts, is University Professor at the University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy. He is the co-author (with Daron Acemoglu) of The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty, and Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty.

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John Haskell Oct 21, 2019

Ukraine has never had the same per capita income as Poland. Even when Poland was partitioned and Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire, observers commented that Poland was wealthier.

In 1991, Poland had begun market reforms and its currency collapsed, while the Ukrainian SSR's output was still measured in Soviet rubles - which lost all of their value the very next year. Ukraine and Poland did not have the same starting point. They weren't even close.
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Wim Roffel Oct 20, 2019

It is easy to blame all problems on corruption. But remember that Russia is quite close to Ukraine on the corruption scales. Yet it has done much better.

One has to wonder whether those celebrated color revolutions were really so good for Ukraine. The lack of continuity may well have prevented the formation of a strong state and damaged the country.

Yanukovich is often demonized for his corruption. But while he and his entourage were corrupt he managed to sideline many of the other oligarchs. As he was bound to lose the next elections there would have been a great chance for a government that really got corruption under control. Instead Ukraine got the Maidan that allowed the traditional oligarchs to make a comeback.
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N Rust Oct 15, 2019

"euphoric moment"? There were a lot of feelings in the territory of the Soviet Union immediately after the dissolution, but nowhere it could described as "euphoric"
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j. von Hettlingen Oct 14, 2019

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson juxtapose Poland with Ukraine in the decades since 1989, following the fall of communism. Both countries were former Soviet satellites. When Soviet central planning came to an end and the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, the economies of the successor states contracted sharply. Almost all had reversed the decline, and managed to grow. But Ukraine has not. Its economy is still smaller than it was in 1991.
Poland was poorer than Ukraine in 1991. It joined the EU in 2004. As of 2017, its GDP was around $524 billion. Ukraine’s was a relatively puny $112 billion, despite having more people than Poland — 42 million to 38 million. Poles earn roughly four times more than Ukrainians, whose country is among the poorest in Europe. Besides, it is struggling to defend its territorial integrity against Russia, which, after the annexation of Crimea, is backing separatists in Eastern Ukraine to fight for breaking away from Kiev.
The authors say “Poland embraced the power of democratic civil society and grew wealthier, Ukraine remained trapped by kleptocratic institutions that bred a culture of corruption and destroyed public trust.” They maintain, “corruption does not emerge from thin air.” In their 2013 book, “Why Nations Fail” they brilliantly highlight why some countries are rich and others poor, and conclude that man-made political and economic institutions underlie economic success, or the lack of it.
Ukraine “has been captured by what we called extractive institutions: social arrangements there empower a narrow segment of society and deprive the rest of a political voice.” If the institutions of power benefit the elite, then the elite’s interests come to collide with, and prevail over those of the wider population. The way Viktor Yanukovych looted Ukraine is a perfect example of “extractive” institutions. He is accused of stealing over $1.5 billion from the country before his removal in 2014.
The authors call for inclusive institutions, saying “by permanently tilting the economic playing field,” the arrangements that extractive institutions present “have long discouraged the investment and innovation needed for sustained growth.” Investors and innovators must have faith in a country’s political system and assurance from the establisment that their investments and financial gains will not be plundered by the powerful.
Extractive institutions impede growth and lead eventually to the collapse of states and empires. For the politiy to provide such reassurance, two conditions have to hold: power has to be centralised and the institutions of power have to be inclusive. But it is not universally true. After its bad experience with “top-down market liberalization” in the 1990s, Poland abandoned its top-down policies and “focused on building a political consensus around a shared vision of reform” by including social partners, like trade unions.
Another country, which has similar structure as Ukraine is Russia, which may explain why Putin has strong emotions for Ukraine. The authors say, Ukraine (as well as Russia) received the “full dose” of top-down “privatization” and “market reform.” Hence, “without even a pretense of empowering civil society, the transition was predictably hijacked by oligarchs and the remnants of the KGB.”
There is hope that a “society-wide mobilization” is still “feasible” in Ukraine, thanks to its “young, politically engaged population.” Fed up with corrupt politicians, they voted for a comedian, Volodymyr Zelenksy earlier this year, who has vowed to fight corruption and build better institutions.
As Trump had sought to bully Zelensky into endorsing “his own corrupt dealings,” the Ukrainian president has the “perfect opportunity” to teach Trump a lesson, by publicly refusing to deal with him and his cronies “until they sort out their own corruption problems (even if it means turning down tainted aid).” The US under Trump may well be the last country on earth to lecture Ukraine on corruption. Now it is up to its courts and voters to show Trump that he is unfit for the office and must be held accountable.
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